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REGULATION, PROHIBITION, AND
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE PROPER
AND IMPROPER USES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
PaulJ. Larkin, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In May 2013, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives created a bipartisan task force to examine the issue of
"overcriminalization."' That neologism fundamentally refers to the
overuse and misuse of the criminal law to punish conduct traditionally
deemed morally blameless, 2 a phenomenon of increasing importance, as
witnessed by the growing interest shown in it by the academy, elected
officials, the media, and the public.3
* Paul J. Larkin, Jr., M.P.P. 2010 George Washington University; J.D. 1980 Stanford Law

School; B.A. 1977 Washington & Lee University; Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation. The views expressed in this Article are the Author's own and should not be construed
as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. Daniel Dew, Andrew Kloster,
Greg Maggs, and Paul Cassell offered helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any errors are
the Author's.
1. Press Release, House Judiciary Comm., House Judiciary Committee Creates Bipartisan
Task Force on Over-Criminalization (May 5, 2013), available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/
news/2013/05082013.html. On February 5, 2014, the House Judiciary Committee reauthorized the
Task Force for an additional six months. Press Release, U.S. House Judiciary Comm., House
Judiciary Committee Reauthorizes Bipartisan Over-Criminalization Task Force (Feb. 5, 2014),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfin/press-releases?ID=2D73C6FD-DAEB-4DA0B4B4-7A2F32BA784F. The House Judiciary Committee had previously demonstrated interest in
this subject. See, e.g., Reining in Overcriminalization:Assessing the Problem,ProposingSolutions:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 11 th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Hon. Robert C. "Bobby" Scott, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security); Over-Criminalization of Conduct/OverFederalization of Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
HomelandSec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14 (2009) (statement of Hon. Robert
C. "Bobby" Scott, Chairman, S. Comm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security). Creation of
the task force suggests that the committee may address the issue through legislation.
2. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization,36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 715, 719 (2013) [hereinafter Larkin, Public Choice Theory]. For different flavors of that
concept, see id.
at 719 n.13.
3. The literature on the subject is already considerable and continues to grow. See, e.g.,
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A prime example of this phenomenon is the use of the criminal law
to enforce a regulatory regime. That practice can pose extraordinary
compliance problems for the average person because criminal and
regulatory laws exist for very different purposes. The function of the
criminal law at bottom is to enforce the moral code that every person
knows by heart-to enforce the minimum substantive content of the
social compact by bringing the full moral authority of government to
bear on violators.4 By contrast, the function of the regulatory system is
to efficiently manage components of the national economy using civil
rules, rewards, and penalties to incentivize desirable behavior without
casting aspersions on violations attributable to ignorance or explanations
other than defiance. Treating regulatory crimes as if they were no
different than "street" crimes ignores the profound difference between
the two classes of offenses and puts parties engaged in entirely
legitimate activities without any intent to break the law at risk of
criminal punishment. There is no good reason to construe criminal and
constitutional law in a manner that ignores the practical difficulties
created by using the criminal law to regulate a modern industrial state.
Both doctrines are sufficiently flexible that courts can accommodate the
government's interests and those of private parties without damaging the
public interest in the process. The only question is whether the courts
and legislatures have the willingness to reconsider ancient common law
doctrines in light of entirely modern practical concerns.
II.

THE MARRIAGE OF THE REGULATORY PROCESS AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW

An elementary principle of criminal and constitutional law is that
the government must clearly identify particular conduct as criminal so
DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2009); TASK
FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR. ASS'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (1998); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization:From Morals
and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005); Edwin Meese Ii,

Overcriminalizationin Practice: Trends and Recent Controversies, 8 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV.
505, 506 (2012); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV.

541, 542 (2005); Daniel Richman, Overcriminalizationfor Lack of Better Options: A Celebrationof
Bill Stuntz, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 64,66 (Michael Klarman et al. eds.,

2012);Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalizationand the Needfor Real Reform: The
Dilemma of Artificial Entities andArtificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1279-80 (2007);
George F. Will, Blowing the Whistle on Leviathan, WASH. POST, July 29, 2012, at A17. See
generally Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (Gene Healy ed.,
2004).
4. See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense,
102 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 734 (2012).
5. See id at 752-53.
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that the average person, without resort to legal advice, can comply with
the law.6 Historically, that requirement posed little difficulty. The
government ordinarily could satisfy that obligation simply by enacting
and making public a statute that was written in terms the average person
could readily understand. Throughout Anglo-American legal history,
contemporary mores condemned certain conduct as harmful, dangerous,
or blameworthy, such as murder, rape, robbery, and burglary. 7 A
legislature could readily draft a straightforward, easily comprehensible
ordinance outlawing those actions by drawing on language widely
understood in the community. 8 To be sure, courts would construe those
statutes after-the-fact in particular cases, and in so doing would flesh out
the terms they use and concepts they embody. 9 But the authority to
define criminal conduct in the American system fundamentally
has rested in the hands of legislatures, 0 who could draft the appropriate
laws without unduly burdening the intellectual abilities of the
average layperson."
6. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459 (2001) (identifying "core due process
concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear
on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent
conduct").
7. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(f), at 14-15 (5th ed. 2010); THEODORE F.
T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 442-62 (5th ed. 1956); Livingston Hall
& Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 641, 644 (1941) ("[T]he
early criminal law appears to have been well integrated with the mores of the time, out of which it
arose as 'custom."').
8. Due process requires not only that the criminal laws are on the books, but also that they
are readily understandable by the average person. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids." (footnote omitted)); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, SuP. CT.
REv., 1962, at 107, 123. See generally Meese & Larkin, supra note 4 (discussing how the
Constitution requires such notice); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960) (discussing the historical development of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine). For recent applications of that doctrine, see, for example, FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317-20 (2012); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-60
(1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-61 (1983).
9. From 1660 to 1860, the English courts claimed the power to outlaw conduct that they
deemed contra bonos mores. See Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 179
(1937). In the federal system, however, only Congress can create a federal crime. See United States
v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). The Due Process Clause keeps state courts from
enlarging criminal liability in an unforeseeable manner. See, e.g., Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct.
1781, 1786-87 (2013); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1964).
10. See LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 2.1(a), at 78-79. Today, the criminal law is almost entirely
statutory. Id.
II. Cf JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 426-27 (8th ed. 1930) ("The common law is in great
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That is no longer true across the board. For more than a century
now, legislatures have used regulatory programs to protect the public
against the sequelae of industrialization.12 Common fields of regulation
involve: food, drugs, public health, housing, transportation, and the
environment. 13 Statutes creating those regulatory schemes define the
circumstances in which regulated conduct may and may not be
undertaken, establish permitting and monitoring protocols to ensure that
the amount and type of regulated activity does not exceed tolerable
limits, and empower the government to use administrative orders and
civil fines as enforcement mechanisms. Those programs typically have
the following characteristics: the relevant statutes create and delegate
implementing and enforcement authority to administrative agencies that
are entrusted to use their superior, technical expertise in order to achieve
the goals of the program; and the statutes vest broad authority and
discretion in the expert agencies in order to permit them the flexibility
deemed necessary for them to respond to advances in scientific and
medical knowledge and changes in manufacturing or other productive
mechanisms. Regulations promulgated by agencies often form highly
reticulated networks demanding a sophisticated understanding of
technical subjects beyond the ken of the average person.14

part nothing more than common horesty and common sense. Therefore although a man may be
ignorant that he is breaking the law, he knows very well in most cases that he is breaking the rule of
right.").
12. Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 595 (1958); see also Gerald E.
Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing CorporateMisconduct, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
23, 37 (1997) ("Legislatures, concerned about the perceived weakness of administrative regimes,
have put criminal sanctions behind administrative regulations governing everything from interstate
trucking to the distribution of food stamps to the regulation of the environment."); Francis B. Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 67 (1933) (recognizing the implantation of
regulatory programs in both the United States and England). Graham Hughes has noted:
[It was in the latter half of the nineteenth century that the great chain of regulatory
statutes was initiated in England, which inaugurated a new era in the administration of
the criminal law. Among them are the Food and Drugs Acts, the Licensing Acts, the
Merchandise Marks Acts, the Weights and Measures Acts, the Public Health Acts and
the Road Traffic Acts.
Hughes, supra, at 595 (footnotes omitted).
13. See Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, The Rise of the American Regulatory State: A View
from

the Progressive Era, in HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF REGULATION

113,

113

(David Levi-Faur ed., 2011).
14. For an excellent discussion of the birth and functioning of environmental regulatory
programs and their interaction with the criminal law, see generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE
MAKING OF ENvIRONMENTAL LAW (2004); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands ofIntegration
in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407
(1995).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss3/2

4

Larkin, Jr.: Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The Proper and

2014]

REGULATION, PROHIBITION, AND O VERCRIMINALIZA TION

Regulatory programs, almost without exception, authorize
administrative agencies to pursue enforcement through civil processes.1 65
The distinction between the civil and criminal laws is an ancient one,'
with state-administered punishment traditionally reserved only for a
violation of the latter.1 7 Many contemporary regulatory programs,
however, define unlawful conduct not just as a civil wrong, but also as a
crime, and empower the government to penalize regulatory infractions
through the same criminal process historically used to investigate,
prosecute, and imprison parties for murder, rape, robbery, theft,
and a host of other
offenses known today as "street" crimes or
18
crimes.
"blue-collar"
Resorting to the criminal law to enforce regulatory programs poses
numerous, difficult compliance problems not present in the case of
traditional "blue-collar" offenses, or even standard "white-collar"
crimes. Those problems stem from several defining features of
regulatory laws that increase the difficulty placed on an average person
to understand precisely where the line is drawn between lawful and
illegal conduct. It is important to identify those problems to determine
whether they can be remedied, and, if so, to decide how that should
be done.
III.

A.

TROUBLE IN THE MARRIAGE

The Number of Regulatory Crimes Today Is Unknown,
but Likely Is Quite High

The number of federal statutes and regulations relevant to criminal
conduct is unknown, but likely is immense. The difficulty in identifying
all of the rules that must be known in order fully to comply with the law
is but one aspect of the broader problem stemming from the massive
number of federal civil and criminal laws on the books today. A serious
problem is that there is no one readily and freely accessible criminal
code that is comprehensive, "reader friendly," and understandable to the
15. See Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. &MARY L. REV. 853, 858-59 (2012).
16. Jerome Hall, Interrelationsof Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 757-58
(1943).
17. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92-94 (2003); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 167-69 (1963). The Supreme Court has discussed how to distinguish criminal from civil
statutes on various occasions, an important distinction is that the government may punish someone
criminally only if he is convicted at a fair trial. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465
(1991).
18. Meese & Larkin, supra note 4, at 735-36, 744-45 (describing criminal enforcement of the
federal environmental laws).
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average person without needing to resort to legal advice. Part of the
problem is due to the number of federal statutes that define crimes. That
number is quite high-so large, in fact, that no one seems to know
exactly how many relevant laws exist.' 9 The U.S. Justice Department
and American Bar Association tried to tabulate them all years ago, but
both gave up the effort without completing the job.2 ° Some
commentators have estimated that there are more than 4000 statutes and
more than 300,000 regulations that define conduct as criminal or
otherwise bear on the proper interpretation of the laws that do. 2 1 If those
authorities are even just half right, the number is more than anyone can
know. If it is true that lawyers, law professors, and judges do not know
all of the laws that impose criminal liability, 22 it is utterly unreasonable
to expect that the average person has that knowledge.
B. Regulations Can Be Difficultfor the Average Person to
Find and Understand
Some criminal statutes are obscure because they are poorly worded.
Others are obscure due to their inconspicuous location. Housing rules in
a local or municipal code that cannot be accessed by the Internet makes
those laws, practically speaking, unavailable to most of the public.
Federal laws can be equally difficult for the average person to find,
particularly if they are part of a complex regulatory scheme. Given the
massive increase in the size of federal and state penal codes over the last
125 years, there is a vast number of ways that someone can violate
criminal statutes today, and it is certain that the average person will be
completely unaware of some of those ways that he or she can break the
law. Few people are aficionados of the U.S. Code, let alone the Code of
Federal Regulations or the Federal Register.
Accordingly, a threshold problem with defining crimes via
regulations is that it can be quite difficult for the average person just to
find all of the relevant statutes, regulations, policy statements, and
interpretive decisions, let alone to understand them, given the often

19. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation's Federal
CriminalLaws, WALL ST. J., July 23,2011, at Al0.

20. Id
21. See, e.g., Paul Rosenzweig, The History of Criminal Law, in ONE NATION, UNDER
ARREST 127, 129 (Paul Rosenzweig & Brian W. Walsh eds., 2010); John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting
the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, HERITAGE
FOuND.
(June
16,
2008),

http://heritage.org/research/reports/2008/06/revisiting-the-explosive-growth-of-federal-crimes.
22. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1871 (2000) ("Ordinary

people do not have the time or training to learn the contents of criminal codes; indeed, even criminal
law professors rarely know much about what conduct is and isn't criminal in their jurisdictions.").
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abstruse rules that agencies adopt for subjects that are recondite,
technical, or scientific in nature. Yet, it is settled law that the
government cannot criminally enforce a law that cannot be understood
by a person "of ordinary intelligence. ' '23 The result should be the same if
the government chose to follow the practice of Caligula and to publish
criminal laws in a location making them, as a practical matter,
unreadable.24 After all, a secret criminal law offers no more notice of
criminal conduct than a law that is publicly available, but
incomprehensible.2 5 An obscure statute thus can create the same notice
problems that we already acknowledge to exist when a statute is unduly
vague. In both cases, the average person would not know what has been
classified as a crime.
C. Congress Often Adopts Broad,AspirationalRegulatory Laws,
Which Makes ComplianceDifficultfor the Average Person
The primary function of most regulatory laws is three-fold: to
identify an important social or economic subject in need of regular
supervision; to create an expert administrative agency directed to
monitor and govern that field and its participants; and to empower the
agency to deal with identified, persistent, or new problems through legal
rules, moral suasion, or enforcement actions.26 Because Congress
expects that administrative agencies will have an indefinite half-life,
regulatory legislation often uses broadly-phrased and aspirational
language as a means of giving agencies the necessary flexibility to deal
with ongoing or newly arising problems, and to point them in a direction
toward which they should aim, even if the finish line is over the horizon
("For example, eliminate all pollution by 2020."). Criminal enforcement
of aspirational goals, however, poses exceptionally difficult notice
problems for the average person, who necessarily must focus on the
particular task at hand, rather than the pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow. The environmental laws serve as an example of this problem:

23.

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); see supra note 6 and accompanying

text.
24. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) ("To enforce such a [vague] statute
would be like sanctioning the practice of Caligula who 'published the law, but it was written in a
very small hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could make a copy of it."').
25. A secret criminal law would violate one of the criminal law's "elementary" principles, the
"rule of legality," which provides that no conduct can be punished as a crime without a law
prohibiting that conduct and affixing a penalty to it. Hall & Seligman, supra note 7, at 650 n.39
("[W]here the law was not available to the community, the principle of 'nulla poena sine lege'
comes into play ...").
26. Sayre, supranote 12, at 68-69.
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[The environmental laws] primarily seek to reduce the potential,
long-term risk of injury to human health and the environment
generally, not just to a specified person or persons. The scientific
evidence necessary to establish the likelihood and type of harm can be
a matter of estimate, judgment, and dispute even among experts. To
empower regulators to reduce such potential, evolving risks, the
environmental laws use broad, aspirational, complex, and dynamic
standards in order to enable regulators to capture all possible harms.
Unlike the criminal laws, which require that forbidden conduct be
defined with certainty, the environmental laws intentionally leave
regulators ample room to maneuver in case new evidence amplifies the
known potential adverse effect of hazardous
substances (e.g.,
27
carcinogens) or brings to light new harms.

It can be unreasonable to expect that the average person will readily
know how broadly-phrased or highly-technical rules must be applied in
particular cases without legal advice. Yet, that is the standard that
criminal laws must satisfy. The Due Process Clause takes as a given the
proposition that legal advice, while potentially valuable, is never a
prerequisite to avoid criminal liability. 28 In cases involving challenges to
penal statutes on the ground that they are void for vagueness, the
Supreme Court has explained that the standard all criminal laws must
pass is whether a person of "ordinary" or "common" intelligence can
readily understand what has been made a crime. 29 That standard leaves
no room for imposing any obligation to consult an attorney before
making a decision. Tasking the public with that duty shifts the obligation
to provide notice of criminal conduct from the government to each
person-a burden that unfairly weighs on parties, such as small
businesses, who do not have their own legal staffs, or individuals of
average or limited means. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressed
reluctance to allow parties to rely on the advice of counsel as a defense
to a crime unless the government has the burden of proving that a
defendant willfully and deliberately flouted the law.30
27. Meese & Larkin, supra note 4, at 744; see also, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating
Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 867, 881-84 (1994) [hereinafter Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection]
(recognizing the health risks that may result from violating environmental laws).

28. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (discussing persons of
"ordinary intelligence"); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (discussing
persons of "common intelligence").
30. Compare Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929) (rejecting the defense of
reliance on the advice of private counsel), with Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1991)
(finding that a defendant's good faith belief that his conduct was lawful is a defense to the charge
of willfully violating tax laws).
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D. RegulatoryAgencies Often Issue Complex, Abstruse Rules,
Which Makes ComprehensionDifficultfor the Average Person
The opposite problem can arise as well. Regulatory schemes
designed to protect the public against health hazards caused by the
improper manufacture, transportation, use, or disposal of hazardous
substances may need to be as detailed and complex as the science itself,
justifying the need for regulation. The result often is that agency rules,
such as the ones promulgated under the federal environmental laws, can
be extraordinarily abstruse, demanding almost as much scientific or
technical knowledge as legal skill to ensure their proper interpretation.3 1
Just as the criminal law does not require a person to consult with an
attorney in order to avoid liability, so too, it should not demand that an
individual resort to a biologist, geologist, or hydrologist before
undertaking facially reasonable activity in a legitimate business.
E. Regulatory Programs Can Make Compliance Difficult Because
They Limit Conduct Without ProhibitingIt Altogether
Laws prohibiting murder and robbery forbid the conduct defined by
those crimes in all circumstances. The law neither fixes a cap on the
number of murders that a miscreant may commit, nor is there an office
to which someone can apply for a permit to commit robbery. By
contrast, the raisond'6tre of a regulatory program is that certain conduct
cannot or should not be forbidden in all circumstances, but must be
managed, controlled, or supervised in order to limit the instances in
which that conduct occurs or poses a hazard. Agency rules merely define
when, where, how, and by whom such conduct may be done. Complying
with a carefully nuanced rule, however, is more difficult than with a
diktat forbidding any and all instances of identified conduct. Even the
lawyers who practice in a regulated industry will not know all of the
applicable statutes, rules, regulations, and agency interpretations-which
makes hopeless the plight of the average person who lacks legal training
or ready and inexpensive access to an attorney.3 2
31. For a good discussion of one such example, see Vidrine v. United States, 846 F. Supp. 2d
550, 561-69 (W.D. La. 2011) (involving the issue of whether used oil was a recyclable product or
hazardous waste).
32. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 4, at 742-43. Edwin Meese and I have stated:
Some public welfare laws have an expansive reach and delegate broad authority to
officials to craft a detailed regulatory scheme using changing, newly available scientific
data. The promulgation of implementing regulations can lead to an avalanche of positive
criminal laws in one form or another. That approach may serve well the needs of
officials tasked with filling in the blanks of a regulatory program, but it ill serves the
interests of regulated parties, who need clearly understandable rules defining criminal
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F. There Is No "Rule of Thumb" Providingthe Average Personwith a
Clear Toolfor Compliance
By and large, laws defining street crimes and most white-collar
offenses are relatively short, straightforward, and easily understandable
by the average person. If you lie, cheat, steal, or physically harm
someone, you have broken the law. Said differently, if you know the
Decalogue, you know what not to do. By contrast, regulatory statutes are
long, elaborate, intricate, and reticulated. They may apply to conduct
demanding knowledge of highly technical and scientific fields; they use
arcane, technological terms; and they do not have a ready go-by, like the
Golden Rule, that a person can read in order to comply with the criminal
law.33 Contemporary mores do not offer a rule of thumb enabling a lawabiding citizen to comply with many regulatory laws on his own, and it
is difficult to see how a citizen's ethics could offer that aid when you
realize that some amount of pollution, for example, is inevitable.34 Those
difficulties can make criminal enforcement of a complex regulatory
regime fundamentally unfair.
G. Regulatory Crimes Can Lack the Mens Rea Elements Found in
Common Law Crimes that Limit Blameworthy Conduct
The common law deemed the presence of "evil intent" necessary to
distinguish morally blameworthy conduct from conduct that, while
damaging, dangerous, or tortious, was not a fit subject for criminal
sanction. 35 At common law, a crime consisted of "a vicious will" and
"an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will. '36 That principle
still has resonance today.37 The criminal law traditionally has looked
liability in order to avoid winding up in the hoosegow. Worse still is the prospect that the
government has interpreted its regulations in nonpublic guidance documents that, in
effect, create "secret law."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
33. See, e.g., Vidrine, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 561-69.
34.

STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 10-29 (1993); Lazarus, Assimilating

EnvironmentalProtection, supra note 27, at 882; Meese & Larkin, supra note 4, at 745-46. Meese
and I have discussed this point by noting:
[S]ome amount of pollution and waste is inevitable in a modem industrial society.
There is no realistic possibility of eliminating all risk of harm from some activities. Even
breathing releases carbon dioxide into the environment. The question, therefore, is not
how we can eliminate pollution entirely, but how we should manage known and
unknown risks from the known, inevitable consequences of nmning a modem economy.
Meese & Larkin, supra note 4, at 745-46 (citations omitted).
35. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-56 (1952).
36.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21 (1979).

37. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616-17 (1994); Morissette, 342 U.S. at
251.
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askance on negligence as a basis 39for liability, 38 and has treated strict
liability crimes with outright scorn.
Regulatory programs, however, often do not treat scienter with the
same respect. 40 The reason for that slight is that regulatory laws see their
goal as protection of the public against particular insults or hazards, such
38. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 1.3(b), at 17; id. § 5.4(a)(2), at 279; Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 421-22 (1958) [hereinafter Hart,
Aims]; Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 84-85
(1908); Otto Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV L. REV. 615, 637-39 (1942); Sayre, supra
note 12, at 72.
39. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, cmt. I (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 77 (rev. ed. 1969) ("Strict criminal liability has never achieved
respectability in our law."); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 342-51 (2d ed.
1960); Hart, Aims, supra note 38, at 422-25; H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal
Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 136, 152 (1968) (stating that "strict liability is
odious"); Hughes, supra note 12, at 602-03; Douglas Husak, Strict Liability, Justice, and
Proportionality, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 81, 91-92 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005); Rollin M.
Perkins, Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Disquieting Trend, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1067-68,
1081 (1983); Paul Roberts, Strict Liability and the Presumption of Innocence: An Exposg of
Functionalist Assumptions, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY, supra, at 151, 182, 191; Sayre, supra
note 12, at 56; A.P. Simester, Is Strict Liability Always Wrong?, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY,
supra, at 21, 21 (stating that strict liability is irrational because it "leads to conviction of persons
who are, morally speaking, innocent"); Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: The Rise
and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 403-04 (1989); Herbert Wechsler, The
Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (1952). See generally Paul J.
Larkin, Jr., Taking Mistakes Seriously, 28 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. (forthcoming 2014) (listing authorities).
There are, however, contrary views, as well. See, e.g., James B. Brady, Strict Liability Offenses: A
Justification, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 217, 222-24 (1972); Steven S. Nemerson, Note, Criminal Liability
Without Fault: A Philosophical Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1570-76 (1975); Richard A.
Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 734 (1960). Herbert
Wechsler wrote:
The most that can be said for such provisions [prescribing liability without regard to
any mental factor] is that where the penalty is light, where knowledge normally obtains
and where a major burden of litigation is envisioned, there may be some practical basis
for a stark limitation of the issues; and large injustice can seldom be done. If these
considerations are persuasive, it seems clear, however, that they ought not to persuade
where any major sanction is involved.
Wechsler, supra, at 1109.
40. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 4, at 744-45. Meese and I wrote:
[T]he environmental laws often do not require proof of the same type of mental state
and actions that ordinary crimes demand. Some criminal environmental laws require
proof of the same 'evil meaning' mind demanded by common law crimes. But most can
lead to a conviction if a person knew what he was doing, even if he did not know that
what he was doing was illegal or wrongful, and sometimes even if he merely acted
negligently. Moreover, the 'knowledge' necessary to establish a violation can be imputed
to a person from the knowledge of others in his company. As far as the necessary
criminal acts go, a person can be held liable not only for his own actions, but also for the
conduct of others under his supervision because of his position in the company. In some
instances, a person can be held criminally liable for not reporting a crime. Finally,
'[i]gnorance or mistake-of-law are generally not valid defenses, except perhaps for a
specific intent crime that requires a knowing violation.'
Id. (citations omitted).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:745

as carcinogens, that cause insidious short- or long-term harm regardless
of the intent or knowledge of the party responsible for their creation or
misuse. 41 Public health programs, for example, seek to empower
agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration or the
Environmental Protection Agency, to intervene in the manufacturing,
distribution, or disposal processes in order to prevent adulterated drugs
from entering the stream of commerce, or to keep hazardous waste from
poisoning the water supply, regardless of whether the party involved was
aware of, or oblivious to, the dangers that his conduct posed.42 Injunctive
remedies are reasonable devices for preventing public injury, and afterthe-fact civil or administrative fines serve reasonable educational and
deterrent purposes.4 3 But the criminal law is society's most powerful
weapon against conduct deemed unlawful and traditionally has been
brought to bear on an individual only when he acted with a wicked
intent, rather than merely negligently, let alone when no blame at all can
be attributed to him. Regulatory laws do not see it that way. That creates
serious notice and compliance problems for small businesses.
IV.

MARRIAGE COUNSELING: AVAILABLE REMEDIES FOR
THOSE PROBLEMS

There are several potential remedies for the notice problems
discussed above. They may not entirely solve those difficulties,
but they certainly advance the ball as close to the goal line as is
reasonably possible.
A.

Identify the Crimes

The first remedy is the easiest to implement: direct the federal
government to identify every statute and regulation that itself defines a
crime or bears on laws that do. Congress could pass a law directing the
Executive Branch (in all likelihood the U.S. Justice Department) to
perform the following tasks: (1) to identify all statutes and regulations
bearing on the definition of criminal conduct; (2) to list all those statutes
in one provision to be codified in Title 18 of the U.S. Code; (3) to
catalogue those laws in a manner that can be readily understood by the
average person; (4) to place the text of those laws on a government
website that every person can access for free over the Internet; and (5) to
keep that website up to date over time. To give that statute bite,
41.
42.
43.
deterrent

Id. at 744.
See id.
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997) ("[All civil penalties have some
effect.").
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Congress could also hold a sword over the government's head by
enacting a separate provision stating that no act of Congress can serve as
a basis for criminal liability unless it has been codified in Title 18 or is
expressly listed in a new Title 18 section, which lists and catalogs all
federal criminal statutes codified elsewhere in the U.S. Code. Those
small steps would help identify all federal criminal laws, thereby
providing the public both some notice of what is44 outlawed, as well as
some information about the scope of this problem.
B. Modify the Substantive Law: A "Willfulness" Mens Rea
Standardand a Mistake of Law Defense
The above proposal would be a valuable first step for the
government to undertake in order to satisfy its obligation to notify the
public as to what conduct had been made a crime.4 5 But making the
corpus of the criminal law available to the average person may still not
guarantee that every person receives adequate notice of the line between
lawful and illegal conduct. One reason is that the esoteric nature of many
regulatory laws and regulations may not be readily understandable
by a person "of ordinary intelligence. 4 6 Contemporary statutes and
regulations are often written in terms making it difficult for an
experienced lawyer to understand their meaning, let alone someone
untutored and inexperienced in the law. Accordingly, there are two other
remedies, both of which are modifications of the substantive criminal
law, that Congress or the federal courts should endorse.
In order to ensure that the criminal law does not condemn morally
innocent parties, Congress could require the government to prove-as a
condition for criminal, but not civil, liability-that a person "willfully"
violated a regulation. The Supreme Court has construed the term
"willfully" to require the government to prove that the accused intended
to breach a known legal duty.47 That approach would place the burden of
proof on the government. Alternatively, Congress should authorize a
defendant to raise a "mistake of law" defense to any such charge, which
44. See Larkin, Public Choice Theory, supra note 2, at 759 n. 193. The Senate Judiciary
Committee recently approved a bill that would require the Executive Branch to provide that notice.
On January 30, 2014, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the Smarter Sentencing Act of
2013. S.1410, 113th Cong. (2013). Section 3 of that bill (among other things) would require the
Executive Branch to identify every federal criminal law, their penalties, and the mental state that
each one requires for conviction. See id.
45.

See supra Part IV.A.

46. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
47. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998); Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135,
138 (1994); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991); United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S.
10, 12 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973).
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would place the burden of proof on the accused. 48 The criminal law
generally does not recognize an exculpatory mistake of law doctrine
today, but Congress and the federal courts have the authority to
recognize a properly-defined defense, and one or the other should do so.
Either step would improve the substantive criminal law by returning its
focus to the type of evil intent or wicked nature that William Blackstone
identified as the hallmark of criminal conduct, 49 and by ensuring that a
party does not wind up in prison for making a reasonable mistake.50
V.

CONCLUSION

The marriage of the regulatory law and the criminal law poses
difficulties not present when either doctrine stands alone. There are
instances in which the union is necessary to protect the public against the
hazards of industrialization, and, in those cases, foregoing criminal
prosecution would result in the inadequate enforcement of laws
safeguarding the public health. But it is a mistake to believe that the use
of the criminal law to enforce a regulatory program is the same as the
use of the penal code to prevent the harms to each other and each other's
property that have been the primary focus of the criminal law since the
days of Blackstone. Just as using any tool for a purpose it was not
designed to serve is likely to damage both the tool and the object of its
intended use, using the criminal law for regulatory purposes will impose
serious costs on both the criminal justice system and the public. At the
end of the day, society may deem those costs justifiable in pursuit of a
more important goal, but that decision cannot be made without
considering precisely how the purposes and uses of the regulatory and
criminal law differ, whether those disparate purposes can be reconciled
without doing violence to either one, and if that reconciliation can be
achieved in a better manner. That decision can only be made after taking
into account the specific elements of a particular regulatory program and
how the criminal law would be used as an enforcement tool. The
recommendations noted above would go a long way toward
accommodating the competing public and private interests. 5'

48. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 718-20 (2013) (stating that the defendant
can be required to prove that he withdrew from a conspiracy); Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1,
17 (2006) (stating that the defendant can be required to prove duress); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,
233, 235 (1987) (stating that the defendant can be required to prove that he acted in self-defense);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208-10 (1977) (stating that the defendant can be required to
prove that he acted due to extreme emotional disturbance).
49. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 21.

50. See Larkin, Public Choice Theory, supra note 2, at 779-81.
5I.

See supra Part IV.
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